The role which Jinnah played in the Hyderabad episode is nothing but atrocious. The below letter is a synopsis of the minutes of meeting between Jinnah and the Hyderabad delegation by Ali Yavar Jung( The Constitutional Affairs Representative) and confirmed and countersigned by Jinnah (4 August 1947).

Below is the synopsis of the discussion:

Nizam: Should I accede to India?
Jinnah: No
Nizam: Will you help me in staying independent?
Jinnah: I cannot guarantee anything
Nizam: If India attacks me, what should I do?
Jinnah: Fight till your last breath. Either you win or die. Either way, you achieve glory.

What is this? Is this the type of talk which you expect from someone who is called a statesman? Jinnah knew from the start that Hyderabad cannot stay independent and if not voluntarily, will be made a part of India forcibly. Instead of guiding them for the betterment of millions involved, he is targeting for their destruction. Is he of the view that since he cannot get Hyderabad, if India gets Hyderabad, it should be a war torn state where religions are at loggerheads and everything is burnt? But for El Edroos who ordered the Hyderabadi army not to fight seeing the futility, the destruction and reprisal, though considerable, was not disastrous.

Below is the text –

The Prime Minister, the Constitutional Affairs member and the Local Government Member interviewed Mr Jinnah on the afternoon of 4th August, the subject of the interview being the note sent by His Exalted Highness to Mr Jinnah on 28 July. In the course of a separate interview, which Sir Walter Monckton had the same day with Mr Jinnah, Mr Jinnah was apprised of the discussion the previous night with the Viceroy.
Mr Jinnah said that the Viceroy and the Congress were following a policy totally contrary to the declared policy of H.M.G. H.M.G. had definitely offered the two alternatives, of accession or political relations, and had also said that time would be given and that the choice would be free and voluntary. If H.M.G. had a shred of conscience, they would put a stop to the threats which were now being given both by the Viceroy and the Congress. It was highly probable that at least the Conservative Party would rebel.
What had been said by the Viceroy about Berar was tantamount to daylight dacoity. It amounted to holding a pistol at a person and making him sign the Instrument of Accession. H.M.G. had admitted the legal and constitutional claim of the Nizam over Berar; the Nizam had all the right on his side and what was being now threatened was the exercise of might. If, even the little that was necessary to continue the Nizam’s legal title to Berar was not done, it would not be much of a loss but the world would know the standard of morality which governed the conscience and acts of the Congress Party. Mr Jinnah said that he could not believe that this could be supported by the sense of honour and conscience of the British people.
Mr Jinnah said that he thought if H.E.H. and his advisers had really made up their mind against accession they should stick to it, firmly and loyally. He did not believe that threats of economic sanction would be carried out but even if they were, His Exalted Highness’ line should be as follows:
You may do what you like and you may threaten as you like but I shall never agree to sign any Instrument of Accession or join the Union unless my conscience says that I should do so. You have no right to coerce me and I have the right to make a free choice.
He said that after all there was some such thing as standing for one’s own right, despite every threat or provocation. If it came to the worst, one should die fighting rather than yield on a point of fundamental principle. Mr Jinnah gave the illustration of what he called the greatest martyrdom in history, the example of Imam Hussain standing for what was right and giving his life for it. All the sanctions in the world then existing were applied against him and his followers but they withstood them and suffered wholesale butchery. It was a moral triumph and they gave their lives for it. That should be the attitude which the Nizam and his advisers and people should adopt. If it came to the worst, rather than yield to coercion or to the surrender of what was right, he should be prepared to abdicate and go in the last resort and show to the world that he had fought uncompromisingly for right as against might. Mr Jinnah said that, in our own times, England had done the same against the heaviest odds. Her people had fought till the end and had reversed the position, by perseverance and conviction, from defeat to victory.
This immoral aspect of threats and coercion on the part of the Viceroy and the Congress, despite the declared policy of H.M.G. to the contrary, should be broadcast to the world and be supported by propaganda so as to convince the man in the street of the wrongness of their position and the rectitude of Hyderabad’s stand for her rights. But any such declaration or announcement should contain a firm indication of absolute willingness to enter into Standstill Arrangements which are necessary for the advantage of both to avoid a breakdown of the administrative machinery or the prevalence of chaos. It must be stated that Hyderabad desires to help India and herself in producing the conditions necessary for stability. If, by the time of such announce the Congress persist in refusing to negotiate Standstill Agreements, the entire responsibility of the consequences would rest with them. The above declaration may mention the fact that, while accession was never understood to be a condition for the conclusion of Standstill Agreements and had in fact nothing to do with them, even such agreements had been refused because the State had declined to accede and had chosen the other alternative offered to the State both by His Majesty’s Government and by the political parties through their acceptance of the Plan of June 3.
As regards His Exalted Highness’ question as to how far Pakistan would be able to assist Hyderabad economically or politically or with troops or arms and equipment and the like, Mr Jinnah said that it was not possible for him at present to give any specific undertaking but that, generally speaking, he was confident that he and Pakistan would come to the help of Hyderabad in every way possible. There should be no doubt on that point. He said that even countries with long-established Governments could not give specific undertakings of the nature desired except by reference to the situation as it developed. The United States could not give any such undertaking when it was first approached by the United Kingdom for help during the last war, but the United States gradually began helping on different fronts until they ultimately came into the war itself. England was very nearly booted when, to her good fortune, Hitler diverted himself from England and attacked Russia, thus bringing the latter into a natural alliance with England and saving England from the concentrated attack which might otherwise have centred upon her. Then, America which had till then kept out of the War except by way of moral and material help, entered the struggle as a result of the Japanese attack upon her. These were providential developments without which all the odds were against England. They brought about Allied victory. If Hyderabad was short of petrol or kerosene, it would not matter if, on the other hand Hyderabad had abundance of firmness, perseverance and courage. The Russians were threatened by a blockade against them but they won the war. If Hyderabad was similarly threatened, there would be other ways to fight, not necessarily with guns if there were no guns, and not necessarily with mechanized transport if there was no petrol.
The Prime Minister thanked Mr Jinnah for the interview and for the elucidation of his views on the different points raised by His Exalted Highness; he also said that H.E.H. would expect a written reply as he had made request in his letter to Mr Jinnah. Mr Jinnah said that, with all the volume of work which had been thrust upon him and the short time left between now and the establishment of Pakistan, it would be most difficult for him to write a detailed letter answering each of the points raised by His Exalted Highness. He said however, that the best way would be to have a record prepared of the interview. The record could then be shown to Mr Jinnah the same night at 9:30 and, if he had any modifications to make, he would make them after which he could sign the record and give it back for to His Exalted Highness. The Prime Minister agreed with this suggestion and the Constitutional Affairs Member was requested to prepare a record of the interviews.
The above notes are correct [version] of the interview and represent my views and I hope that H.E.H. will be firm and accept them and it accordingly and I most fervently pray to God that He would help us all as our cause is righteous.
M.A. Jinnah